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David E. West
Armstrong, Rawlings & West
Attorney for Plaintiff and Appellant
1300 Walker Center
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 359-2093
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
EVE A. SMITH,
Plaintiff and Appellant, j
vs.
WALTER THOMAS SMITH,

y

Case No. 20458

Defendant and Respondent.)

APPELLANT'S BRIEF ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
The following issues are presented for review in this
appeal:
1.

In an action for divorce, did the trial court err

in concluding that property acquired by gift from wifefs
parents, and conveyed to both spouses, must be considered as
a part of the marital estate?
2.

Did the trial court misapply the parol evidence

rule in rejecting evidence from the wife's father to explain
why the gift was made in the name of both spouses?
3.

Did the trial court err in failing to award the

wife other assets that she brought into the marriage?
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This was an action for divorce in which the contested
issues involved the disposition of marital assets. The
principal asset of the marriage was a home in which the parties resided during most of their five-year marriage.

The

home was constructed by the parties upon a lot given to them
by the plaintiff-wife1s parents.

Plaintiff claimed in this

action that the lot was not an asset that had been acquired
through the joint efforts of the parties, and since it was a
gift from her parents, and in effect an advance on her inheritance, that the value of the lot should be awarded to
her.

Defendant-husband claimed on the other hand that since

the lot had been deeded by plaintiff's parents to both parties, that it should be awarded to both of them.

The trial

court adopted the husband's position and awarded the proceeds from the sale of the lot to both parties (R-119, 125).
In making this award, the Court concluded that plaintiff was
barred by reason of the parol evidence rule from having her
father explain the reason for the gift (T-94).

The trial

court believed that in dealing with the diposition of this
property he could not consider anything beyond the four
corners of the written document evidencing the gift (T-94).
In addition to the above, the evidence established that
the wife contributed $10,000.00 toward the construction
costs of the home, which amount was obtained from a savings
- 2 -

account and from the proceeds of the sale of other property
that she owned prior to the marriage (T-19, 21, 22). The
trial court considered this as a contribution to the marriage upon which she should not be reimbursed at dissolution
(T-110; R-116).
It is the wife's position on appeal that the trial
court committed manifest error in not awarding to her the
value of the lot given by her parents, and the assets that
she brought into the marriage.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff and defendant were married in September, 1977
(T-7).

Both spouses had been married before, and both had

children from a prior marriage (T-26).

No children were

born as issue of this marriage (T-10).

The parties develop-

ed difficulties in their marriage and separated in December
of 1982 (T-10), although the divorce was not tried until
September of 1984.
Shortly after the marriage, in December, 1977, the
plaintiff's parents, Frank and Afton Armstrong, gave the
parties an interest in a one acre lot upon which it was expected that they would construct a home.

The lot that was

the subject of the gift was part of a six acre parcel where
the Armstrong family had resided since 1938 (T-14, 91).
Plaintiff was an only child (T-14).

Plaintiff's mother was

80 years old and her father 84 years old (T-14).
- 3 -

In making

the gift, the parents wanted to have their daughter close by
(T-13).

The property was part of the family homestead which

had existed all of plantiff's life, and it was always known
that the property would eventually be hers (T-18).

The gift

of the lot was reduced to a written Memorandum of Agreement
(Exhibit 10) .1

The written agreement reflected that it

was the intention of Mr. and Mrs. Armstrong to give the
parties a one-half interest in the lot.2

The Armstrongs

retained the other one-half interest but agreed to claim no
monetary interest in any improvements to be built upon the
property.

They also retained a first right of refusal to

purchase the property if it were ever offered for sale.
Deeds to the property were executed in accordance with the
terms of the Memorandum of Agreement (T-16).
The value of the one acre lot was disputed,3 however,
the Court found the value to be $135,000 (or $67,500 for the
one-half interest).

In determining valuation, the Court

1

See Appendix A for full copy of Memorandum of
Agreement.
2

The one-half interest in the lot retained by the
Armstrongs was not disputed, and it was stipulated that upon
post divorce sale of the property the value of the one-half
interest would be paid to them (T-3). It is only the
one-half interest that is the subject of the gift that is in
dispute in this case.
3

Plaintiff testified that the lot value was $150,000.
Defendant testified that the lot value was $100,000.
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accepted the testimony of Gary F. Free, a professional
appraiser (T-100, 108); (R-115).

Frank Armstrong, plain-

tiff's father and donor of the gift, was called as a witness.

The Court, believing that it could not look beyond

the four corners of Exhibit 10 (Appendix A ) , refused to
permit Mr. Armstrong to explain the reasons for the gift
(T-94).

Plaintifffs offer of proof showed that had Mr.

Armstrong been permitted to respond, he would have testified
that the gift was made to both parties because his daughter
asked him to make it that way for financing purposes; and
that the parties needed the property in both names in order
to get a construction mortgage (T-95J.4

Further, he would

have testified that the gift was made within approximately
three months of the marriage and that he had absolutely no
reason of any kind to make a gift of this magnitude to the
defendant, except for the fact that the defendant was
married to his daughter (T-96).
After the gift of the lot, the parties proceeded with
the construction of a home.

Defendant-husband was in the

construction business and operated a company known as Vico
Building Specialities (T-30).

Defendant, through his

company, acted as the general contractor on the home (T-29).

4

Earlier testimony was to the effect that the gift was
made to both spouses only because plaintiff requested that
it be made that way for loan purposes (T-16).
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A construction loan was obtained from Western Savings & Loan
Association in the amount of $55,000.00.

In addition to the

loan proceeds of $55,000.00, Western required the parties to
advance $10f000.00 into the construction account so that the
total construction proceeds would amount to $65,000.00.
Plaintiff-wife contributed the $10,000.00 from her separate
funds.

These funds were traced from a savings account of

$2,249.87 that plaintiff owned prior to the marriage (T-19)
and $7,619.19 from the proceeds of a sale of other property
that plaintiff owned prior to the marriage (T-21, 22). 5
At the time of the divorce, the mortgage balance at Western
was approximately $52,000.00 (T-ll).
During the construction of the home, defendant claimed,
through his company, to have contributed some $32,000.00 to
the cost of construction over and above the amount of the
construction loan.
the plaintiff.

This claim was vigorously disputed by

During cross examination, it was acknow-

ledged that the husband had merely gone through the company
check register and made a list of whatever expenses he
thought might be attributable to the house.

When confront-

ed, however, with copies of the actual check vouchers, it

5 Husband disputed that wife put up the $10,000.00 to
Western Savings & Loan, but had no explanation where the
$10,000.00 came from (T-31). The Court's findings acknowledge that these contributions were made, but considered
them as a "normal use of funds by a married couple" (R-117).
- 6 -

appeared that numerous of them made reference to other jobs,
or to no job at all (T-39 to 54). The trial court viewed
any construction expense as nothing more than an appropriate
contribution in developing the marital estate, and further
noted that the evidence wholly (trial transcript erroneously
uses the word "only" for "wholly") failed to support defendant's claim (T-110).
During the marriage, the real property taxes on the
home were paid by plaintiff's father, Frank Armstrong.

The

amount of taxes paid by him was $3,521.00. Mr. Armstrong
also paid $3,500.00 for the installation of a water line,
and $600.00 for the furnishing of sod.

(T-22, 55, 96, 97,

109).
Both parties believed, and the Court so found, that the
value of the home, including the lot, at the time of the
divorce, was $250,000.00 (T-3, 107).
The only other assets of the marriage were personal
property items (which were disposed of by stipulation) and
some original paintings that had been given to the parties
by the husband's father (T-23, 57).
Throughout the marriage, plaintiff was employed by the
Univerity of Utah in the Registrar's Office (T-18).
salary was $540.00 every two weeks (T-19).

Her net

Her entire

salary was consumed during the marriage for living expenses
(T-18).

Plaintiff also had a retirement account in
- 7 -

connection with her employment at the University of Utah
(T-19).

The retirement account had a value of $587.23 when

the parties were married.

In December, 1982 (the time that

the parties separated), the account had a value of
$7,094.21.

In September of 1984 (the time of trial), the

account had a value of $10,588.22 (T-5, 6; Exhibit 9 ) .
It was also acknowledged by wife that she had debts of
$3,417.11 coming into the marriage.

These debts were paid

during the marriage with marital income (T-7).
No alimony or attorney's fees were claimed by either
party (T-2).
Based upon the above facts and evidence, the Court distributed the assets of the marriage in the following manner
(R-122):6
1.

It was ordered that the home be sold.

2.

From the proceeds of sale, the Armstrongs were to

be paid their existing interest in one-half of the lot, plus
reimbursed for the taxes and improvements that they paid.
3.

The remaining net proceeds of sale were to be

equally divided between the parties.

Wife gets no credit

for the $67,500.00 gift from her parents.
4.

Husband was awarded an amount equivalent to one-

half of the increase in wife's retirement account to the

6

See Appendix B for full copy of Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law.
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date of separation ($3,253.59).

An adjustment for this

credit was to be made in the distribution of the home sale
proceeds.
5.

Wife gets no credit for the $10,000.00 in assets

that she brought into the marriage.
6.

Husband was awarded all of the original paintings

that were gifted to the parties from his father.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1.

Under Utah case law, marital property is property

acquired through the "joint efforts" of the parties.
Preston v. Preston (Utah 1982), 646 P.2d 705; Jesperson v.
Jesperson (Utah 1980), 610 P.2d 326.
2.

Utah case law recognizes that property acquired by

inheritance is not acquired through the "joint efforts" of
the parties.
3.

Preston v. Preston, supra.

Property acquired by gift is not substantially

different than property acquired by inheritance.

While

there is no Utah case law dealing specifically with gifts,
other jurisdictions clearly recognize that gifted property,
even made in the name of both spouses, is not marital property.7
4.

The parol evidence rule does not apply at all to

this case.

Plaintiff is not attempting to vary the terms of

a written document.

Plaintiff does not dispute the

1

See Case Authority commencing on page 11 of this
brief.
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existence of legal titlef but contends that the state of
title is not binding in distributing marital property.
5.

Under Utah law, plaintiff is entitled as a matter

of law to be awarded the assets that she brought into the
marriage.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT RESTORING TO WIFE
THE GIFT OF PROPERTY FROM HER PARENTS
§30-3-5, Utah Code Annotated, provides in effect that
when a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may make
such orders relating to the disposition of property "as may
be equitable".

In determining what is "equitable", the

court has never been bound by the names in which property is
held.

The state of title prior to the divorce decree is not

binding on the court and the court is empowered to make any
distribution that is just and equitable, and may compel conveyances to that end.

Workman v. Workman (Utah 1982), 652

P.2d 931; Jackson v. Jackson (Utah 1980), 617 P.2d 338.
In the absence of some unusual circumstance, the court
in recent years in determining what is equitable has construed marital property to be such property as may have been
acquired through the "joint efforts" of the parties.
Preston v. Preston (Utah 1982), 646 P.2d 705? Jesperson v.
Jesperson (Utah 1980), 610 P.2d 326.
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Thus in Jesperson, the

court held that it was proper to award plaintiff assets
brought into the marriage as they were not acquired through
the "joint efforts" of the parties.

And in Preston, it was

held error not to award the husband the amount he brought
into the marriage and contributed on a cabin, together with
the proportion of appreciation in value attributable thereto, before the value of the cabin was divided between the
parties.

Also in Preston, the court properly awarded to the

wife all of the property she inherited, it being held that
inheritance property is not acquired through the "joint
efforts" of the parties.
There is no logical distinction between property
acquired from inheritance and property acquired by gift.
Neither is acquired by reason of "joint efforts".

Indeed,

the facts of the instant case demonstrate that the gift of
property by elderly parents to an only child was nothing
more than an advance upon her inheritance.

Appellant is not

aware of any Utah case authority that specifically deals
with the question of gifts as being marital or non-marital
property; however, case law from other jurisdictions, both
old and new, solidly supports the proposition that a gift to
both spouses from the relatives of one spouse should be
treated as if intended as a gift to the related spouse
alone.

Singer v. Singer (Ky. 1934), 68 S.W.2d 34; Hegel v.
- 11 -

Hegel (Fla. 1971)f 248 5.2d 212; Johnson v. Johnson (Neb.
1981), 307 N.W.2d 783; Angel v. Angel (Ky. 1978), 562 S.W.2d
661; Elliott v. Elliott (Mo. 1981), 621 S.W.2d 305.
In Singer v. Singer, supra, the wife's father bought a
house for the parties and conveyed it to the husband and
wife jointly.

In awarding the house to the wife, the

Kentucky court made the following comment:
"There is no dispute that the father bought the
house and lot in Georgetown for his daughter. Her
husband had the deed drawn to them jointly and the
father and daughter both knew that the deed had been
so drawn and the father said just let it stand. But
very clearly it was property which came to the
daughter from the father and on the divorce should
be adjudged to her".
In Hegel v. Hegel, supra, the husband claimed that he
was entitled to one-half of property that had been conveyed
to both spouses as tenants by the entireties.

In rejecting

the arguments of the husband, the Florida court stated:
"As frequently happens, this case arrived in the
trial court with the record or "paper" title to
certain property being held jointly by the parties
as tenants by the entireties. Ordinarily, the
record title speaks for itself and upon divorce the
parties become tenants in common. However, either
party may establish an interest in the record or
"paper" ownership of the other party under certain
well-defined circumstances.
Once a wife initially makes it appear that her
separate funds supplied the entire consideration for
the purchase of certain property, then, the husband's
record or "paper" interest therein is in jeopardy.
Under such circumstances there is no presumption of
a gift to the husband of his record interest therein;
on the contrary, the presumption arises that the
husband is the trustee of a resulting trust with
the wife as beneficiary thereof or that a special
- 12 -

equity exists in her favor as set forth above. In
order to preserve his record interest the husband has
the burden of establishing that a gift was, in fact,
intended or of attempting to establish a "special
equity" therein.
In Johnson v. Johnson, supra, the Nebraska court made
it clear in dividing the assets of a marriage that the trial
court was entitled to consider that the wife contributed
nothing toward the acquisition of certain properties and
that the source of funds were gifts from the husband's
mother.

Under such circumstances, it was held that "a court

may divide property between the parties in accordance with
the equities of the situation, irrespective of how legal
title is held".
In Angel v. Angel, supra, property was conveyed by gift
to both spouses from the wifefs brother.

The property was

treated as non-marital property and awarded to the wife.
The court held that the property acquired by gift should be
considered as the wifefs separate property unless the trial
court finds that the husband was named as a grantee for some
reason other than his marriage.
In Elliott v. Elliott, supra, the court rejected the
husband's contention that family heirlooms given to the
parties by the wife's parents should be considered as gifts
to both spouses.

The heirlooms were shown to have been in

the family for many generations and were treated as gifts to
the wife alone.
- 13 -

In Workman v. Workman (Utah 1982), 652 P.2d 931, the
Utah Court awarded property to both the husband and wife
that had been conveyed from husband's mother.

The reason

that the property was awarded to both spouses was that the
wife had used her separate funds to purchase the property
from the husband's mother and to clear various pending
liens.

In making this award, the court totally ignored an

earlier Quit-Claim Deed conveying the property to the husband alone.
The instant case falls squarely within the rule of the
above authorities.

The husband paid no consideration for

the gifted property.

Husband has shown no special equity,

nor met his burden of showing that a gift to him was in fact
intended.

The husband was named as a grantee for financing

purposes (T-16).

Mr. Armstrong's proffered testimony was to

the effect that the Armstrongs had no reason to make a gift
to the husband except for the fact that he was married to
their daughter.

Under these circumstances, it is clear that

the wife should have been awarded the value of the gift from
her parents.
In determining an "equitable" distribution of the
assets, it is also difficult to justify the trial court's
treatment of gifts from their respective parents.

The gift

from the wife's parent of the building lot was treated by
the trial court as marital property and divided between the
- 14 -

parties.

Yet the gift of the original paintings to both

spouses by the husband's father was treated as non-marital
property and the husband was awarded all of the paintings.
Wife does not seriously believe that she should be awarded
the paintings because she recognizes them as gifts from her
husband's parents.

Yet, by the same token, she urges in

accordance with all of the authorities herein, that the gift
from her own parents be awarded to her in a consistent
manner.
POINT II
TRIAL COURT MISAPPLIED THE PAROL EVIDENCE RULE IN
REJECTING EVIDENCE FROM WIFE'S FATHER TO EXPLAIN THE GIFT
It is important to note that this is not a case where
the trial court considered the circumstances of the gift and
then attempted to make a fair and equitable distribution of
assets.

Rather, it is a case where the trial judge believed

that he could not go beyond the written document evidencing
the gift and therefore considered that under the parol evidence rule if the gift was made in writing to both parties
the whole matter ended at that point and there was nothing
further to decide (T-94).

Plaintiff believes this to be

patent error.
The parol evidence rule is a rule of substantive law
that prevents parties from offering extrinsic evidence to
change or modify the terms of an unambiguous written
- 15 -

document.

Rowley v. Marrcrest Homeowners Association (Utah

1982), 656 P.2d 414; State Bank of Lehi v. Woolsey (Utah
1977) , 565 P.2d 413.

Plaintiff in the instant case is not

attempting to change or modify the terms of any written
agreement.

She acknowledges the existence of said agreement

in its present form.

She even acknowledges that she re-

quested her father to draw the documents as they were drawn.
What plaintiff does claim under the authorities cited in
Point I is that the state of title as evidenced by written
documents, whether ambiguous or unambiguous, simply isn't
binding or even necessarily material when dividing assets in
a divorce decree.

And if the writing itself is not binding

it logically follows that the court can, and should, look to
all of the surrounding circumstances in order to make an
equitable distribution.

The power of the court to make

equitable divisions of property is so fundamental that it
cannot even be completely defeated by contract.

Mathie v.

Mathie (1961), 12 Utah 2d 116, 363 P.2d 779.
Even if the parol evidence rule were to apply, this
case would fall under one of its many exceptions.

It is

stated at Am. Jur.2d, Evidence, §1040, that extrinsic evidence may be admitted to prove the circumstances under which
a contract is made, wherever, without the aid of such evidence, the contract cannot be applied to its proper subject
matter.

In Bullfrog Marina, Inc. v. Lentz (1972), 28 Utah
- 16 -

2d 261; 501 P.2d 266, the court held that in determining the
issue of completeness, parol evidence is admissible to show
the circumstances under which the agreement was made and the
purposes for which the agreement was executed.

Also, it is

always permissible to use parol evidence to show the actual
consideration for a deed or agreement.

Wood v. Roberts

(Utah 1978), 586 P.2d 405.
It is plaintiff's position that 1) the parol evidence
rule doesn't apply at all to this case, and 2) even if it
did apply, an exception would exist. None of the many cases
cited by appellant herein that comment on the non-binding
nature of the state of title even mention the parol evidence
rule.

Plaintiff urges that she is entitled to have the

court consider evidence by her father explaining the circumstances of the gift.

If Mr. Armstrong's proffered testi-

mony were admitted and considered by the trial court, it is
quite obvious that the result of the case would be different.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO AWARD WIFE THE
ASSETS THAT SHE BROUGHT INTO THE MARRIAGE
It was established by the evidence that the wife
contributed $10,000.00 toward the construction of the home
that was derived from assets that predated the marriage
(T-19, 21, & 22). This contribution clearly was not
- 17 -

acquired through the "joint efforts" and should have been
awarded to wife pursuant to the mandate of Jespersen v.
Jespersen, supra, and Preston v. Preston, supra.

In Pres-

ton, it was held error not to award the husband the amount
he brought into the marriage and contributed on a cabin,
together with the proportional appreciation in value attributable to the contribution.
Although the later case of Workman v. Workman, supra,
states that the rule in Preston is not necessarily invariable, it would seem that there must be some other compelling
reason or circumstance to cause the rule not to apply.

Hus-

band will no doubt claim that his own financial contributions to the home is such an offsetting circumstance.

There

is however a drastic difference between plaintiff's
$10,000.00 contribution and the claimed contributions of
defendant.

In the case of the $10,000.00 by the wife, the

funds are clearly traceable to assets of the wife that she
brought into the marriage (T-19, 21, 22). However, with
respect to the husband, there is no evidence that he brought
anything into the marriage.

His claimed contributions, if

any, came from his construction company which, but for the
contributions, would have simply increased his income and in
turn the marital estate.

This assumes that he made any such

contributions at all, which was a matter in dispute in which
his evidence failed (T-110).
- 18 -

Wife acknowledges that her pre-existing debts of
$3,417.11 should be taken into consideration in awarding
premarital assets.

Since the debts were paid with marital

income (one-half of which would be the wife's) a setoff of
$1,708.55 (or one-half of the amount of the debt) would be
appropriate.

With this adjustment, wife is entitled to be

restored $8,291.45, plus the proportionate appreciation to
the home.
CONCLUSION AND RELIEF SOUGHT
Based upon all of the arguments and authorities as
cited herein, it is respectfully urged that the divorce
decree of the District Court be modified in the following
respects:
1.

That the appellant-wife be awarded the first

$67,500.00 of net proceeds from the sale of the parties1
home, which amount represents the value of the one-half
interest in the lot given to the parties by the wife's
parents.
2.

That in addition to the above, the appellant-wife

be awarded $8,291.45, plus the proportionate appreciation to
the home attributable to said amount, representing her
contribution to the home from assets that predated the
marriage.
In the alternative, and in the event the court views
the existing record insufficient to justify the relief
- 19 -

claimed, then the matter should be remanded to the lower
court for either a new trial or instructions to reopen the
trial and consider the evidence of Frank Armstrong relating
to the circumstances of the gift.

In such event, the court

should instruct the trial court that wife is entitled to the
relief claimed if the testimony of Frank Armstrong is as
proffered.
Respectfully submitted,
ARM^TR^NG, RAWLINGS & WEST
David E. West
1300 Walker Center
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for Appellant

- 20 -

MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT

THIS AGREEMENT made this 10th day of May, 1978, by and between
FRANK ARMSTRONG and AFTON C. ARMSTRONG, his wife, hereinafter called
the "Armstrongs", and WALTER SMITH and EVE A. SMITH, his wife, hereinafter called the "Smiths",

WITNESSETH:
That the Armstrongs on December 25, 1977 gave an undivided onehalf interest in the hereinafter described property to the Smiths with
the understanding that it would be particularly described when the
parties returned from a vacation,

it was to provide that if the

Smiths ever sold the property the Armstrongs would have the first
right of refusal to purchase same, and
WHEREAS, the Smiths want to build on the property and the company
making the loan to the Smiths require that the property be made subject to a lien of the payment of s^id loan,
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY UNDERSTOOD AND AGREED that the Armstrongs will transfer the entire tttle to said property for the purpose
of securing a loan, but for this purpose only, and that the Smiths will
immediately reconvey a one-half interest back to the Armstrongs.
In the event of a sale or partition of the property, the Armstrongs
will have no monetary interest in a^ny improvements placed on the
property, their interest being only in the land and not in such improvements .
In the event of a sale or conveyance of the property, the Armstrongs
are hereby given the first right to purchase at the price a bona fide
purchaser is willing to pay for it* such right to be exercised within
thirty days after written notice o£ such contemplated sale is given to
the Armstrongs; otherwise, this ri^ht shall become null and void.

APPENDIX A

EXHIBIT "A"

Commencing at a point 752 feet South from the Northeast corner of Section
22, Township 2 South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Meridian, and running thence
East 6.17 feet; thence South 415 feet; .nence West 97«17 feet; thence North
378 feet; thence Northwesteriy 178. p feet, more or less, to a point 266
feet West of the point of beginnx»»ft, thence East 266 feet to beginning. Containing one acre*
Together with an easement and right of way for Ingress and egress and for
water, sewer, power and gas lines and other public utilities over, In and
upon the following described real property: Commencing 286 feet West of the
Northeast corner of said Section 22, Township 2 South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake
Meridian, and running thence South 752 feet; thence East 286 feet; thence
North 25 feet; thence West 266 feet; thence North 727 feet; thence West 20
feet to the point of beginning.
Together with all water and water rights appurtenant to or used upon said
premises, Including water and water rights In the Upper Ellison Ditch.

m
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Utah

'M *2 1SS5
DAVID S. DOLOWITZ (0899)
of and for
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER
Attorneys for Defendant
185 South State Street, Suite 700
P.O. Box 11898
Salt Lake City, UT 84147
Telephone: (801) 532-1234

O sfK ofd D»st Court
Don *• ~

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
* * * * * * *
EVE A. SMITH,
)
)

Plaintiff,
v.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

)
)
)
)
)

WALTER THOMAS SMITH,
Defendant.

Case No. D-83-63
Judge J. Dennis Frederick

* * * * * * *
The above-entitled matter
trial

on

Thursday,

Honorable J.

Dennis

the

20th

Frederick

came before

day

of

the court for

September,

presiding.

The

1984,

the

plaintiff

was

present in person and represented by counsel, David E. West.
The defendant was present in person and represented by counsel,
David S. Dolowitz.

The court heard and considered the testi-

mony of the parties and thesr respective witnesses, considered
the exhibits introduced into evidence and being advised in the
premises and having

considered

tions

then

of

counsel,

the arguments and representa-

considered

the

objections

of
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APPENDIX B

the

plaintiff to the proposed findings of fact, conclusions of 1c
and decree of divorce on December

17, 1984, now

enters

tl

following as its

FINDINGS OF FACT
L

The

plaintiff

and

defendant

were

residents

Salt Lake County, State of Utah, when this action was filed a
had been so for more than three months prior to that date.
2.

The parties were married on September 4, 1977,

Salt Lake City, Utah.
3.

The parties

separated

in

December

of

3 982 a

this action has been pending before the courts since January
1983.
4.

There have been no children born as issue of tl*

marriage and none are expected.
5.

The

defendant

treated

the

plaintiff

cruel!

causing her great mental distress and suffering by, when th<
interests diverged, refusing to discuss the problems confroi
ing the parties
activities

to

and

to work

continue

the

out a joint
marriage

set of values

relationship.

The d

tress that she suffered as a result of the divergence of th
values and activities made continuation of the marriage re
tionship impossible.
6.

The defendant withdrew his counterclaim for

vorce at the commencement of the trial.
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7.

Plaintiff

expressed

a

desire,

and

the

parties

stipulated, that plaintiff could be awarded her maiden name of
Eve Armstrong.
8.
request

for

The

parties

alimony

by

stipulated

either

party

that

there

would

or a request

be

by

no

either

party for attorney fees or costs to be awarded.
9.

The

parties

stipulated

that

their

personal

property could be divided as shown on Exhibits 4-D, 6-D and 7-D
which were stipulated into evidence.
10.
property

The

parties

acquired

by

stipulated

that

the

home

and

real

them at 2662 East 6200 South should be

sold; that the mortgage balance should be paid; and that Mr.
land Mrs. Frank Armstrong, the parents of the plaintiff, were
owners of an undivided one-half interest in the real property
upon which the home had been built and they should be compensated

at

the time

of

sale

for

the

value

of

the

home

is

of

that

ownership

interest.
11.
(should

be

The
listed

value
for

sale with Gump

ideally, sold at that price.
parties

should

pay

the

$250,000.00

& Ayers

and

Realtors,

it
and,

From the proceeds of sale, the

mortgage

balance,

then

Mr. and

Mrs.

Armstrong should be paid $67,500.00, which represents one-half
| of the value of the land on which the home is built which is
found to be $135,000.00.

Mr. and Mrs. Armstrong should also be

•3"

il5

reimbursed for contributions to the home and real property o
the parties paid, for a total of $75,100.00.
12.

If the parties do receive $250,000.00

for thei

home, after payment of the sums set out in paragraph 11 above
there would be a net distribution to each party of $61,404.35
From

the

plaintiff's

$3,253.50 which
time of

share

of

this

sum

should

represents one-half of her

separation

of

the parties, it

be

deduct€

retirement

being

agreed

at ti
by tl

parties that all of her retirement should be awarded to her a
this is an offset for that property which is determined to be
marital property and the sum of $3,253.50 should be added
the proceeds
plaintiff
payment

of sale

would
of

awarded

to the

receive, assuming

$58,150.85,

and

the

defendant

receipt

so

that t

of $122,808.70,

defendant

a

payment

$64,657.85.
I

13.

A gift was made by Mr. and Mrs. Frank Armstrc

Ito the plaintiff and defendant of an undivided one-half int€
i

jest in the real property on which their home was built. :
i
|court finds from the written documents evidencing such giJ
j
that it was a gift to both parties and should be considered
marital property.

Each of the parties made contributions

| construction of the home of property that they owned prior
the marriage or accumulated during the marriage of the part
in the form of contributions by the plaintiff of her savi

and the defendant of money from the construction company which
he

operated.

establish

Plaintiff

that

their

should be considered

and

defendant's

contributions

evidence

were

other

as having been placed

failed

than

that

to
and

into the home as

part of the normal use of funds by a married couple during the
course of their marriage.
14.

The defendant owned prior to the marriage of the

parties, a number

of paintings and watercolors

that had been

painted by his father and the parties were given five paintings
and watercolors by the defendant's father during the course of
the marriage.
From

the

foregoing

Findings

of

Fact,

the Court

now

makes and enters the following
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The

plaintiff

should

be

awarded

a

decree

of

divorce terminating the marriage of the parties, which decree
should become final upon entry.
2.

No alimony should be awarded to either party.

3.

No costs or

attorney fees should be awarded

to

either party.
I

4.

Plaintiff

should be awarded

her

maiden

name

of

Eve Armstrong.
5.

The plaintiff should be awarded as her sole and

separate property the following items of personal property:
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Plastic endtable
One-four-piece couch
One chrome lamp
Seven needlework pillows
One large white coffee table
Two single beds
Directors chair
One plastic bookshelf unit
One antique desk and chair
Redwood table and bench set
The proceeds from the sale of the 1972
Ford Bronco
Oakleaf graphic
1977 Datsun
Oak table and chairs
Oak coffee table
One washer
One dryer
One large Mexican rug
Three oak dressers
Two portable color TV sets
Small general kitchen appliances
Queen-size bed
Magazine rack
Her crystal collection
The oak bookshelf
Medium graphic
One-half of the dishes, silverware and
cooking
utensils
acquired
during
t
course of the marriage by the parties a
all of the dishes, silverware, and coc
ing utensils acquired by her prior to t
marriage of the parties
Microwave oven
Brass lamp
Hideabed sofa
Four bookcase units
6.

The defendant should be awarded as his sole <

separate property the following items of personal property:
The upright freezer
Stereo
His books
Brass lamp
Queen-sized bed
TV table

lis

Two bucket chairs
Large beanbag
Magazine rack
Drafting table
Black and white portable TV
Patio table and chairs
Power saws and equipment
His personal effects and belongings
His tools
Canvas rocking chair
Sofa and chair set
One oak endtable
Refrigerator
Three oak barstools
One small Mexican rug
Oak desk unit
Tall oak dresser
Two low oak dressers
One oak headboard
Dishes, silverware and cooking utensils
that he brought into the marriage and
one-half of the dishes, silverware and
cooking utensils acquired by the parties
after their marriage
One large graphic
One small cloth print
Bed lamp
Crystal wineset
Bar supplies
7.

The

home

and

real

property

acquired

by

the

parties during the course of their marriage at 2662 East 6200
South

should

$250,000.00.

be

listed

for

sale

and

sold,

ideally,

for

The proceeds of sale should be utilized first to

pay the costs and expenses of sale and the existing mortgage
obligation

of

approximately

$52,000.00.

Mrs. Frank Armstrong - should be paid

Then,

$75,100.00.

Mr.

and

The remain-

ing balance should be divided equally between the parties, provided, however, that after dividing the proceeds equally, the

i^

sum of $3,253,50 shall be subtracted from the funds to be pai
to the plaintiff. Eve Smith, and shall be added to the funds t
be

paid

achieve

to

defendant/

the

proceeds

proceeds of the sale
after
would

adjustment
be

paid

defendant*

Walter

Smith.

envisioned
for

by

If
the

division would

the

sale

parties,

were t
the

ne

be $122/808.69, an

as heretofore stated, the sum of $58,150.8
to

the

plaintiff

and

$64,657.85

to

th

These sums would be adjusted as required in orde

to divide the net proceeds of sale if they are other than tl
$250,000.00 upon which the court based its conclusions and i
reimburse

Mr.

and

Mrs. Frank

Armstrong

for

additional

coi

tributions to the home and real property of the parties f
payment of newly accrued taxes.
8.

The property

at 2662 East

6200

South

shall

listed in Gump & Ayers for sale unless the parties agree
another real estate agent to handle the sale for them.
9.

The

plaintiff

should

be

awarded

the retireme

fund accumulated by her at the University of Utah.
10.

The paintings by the defendant's father should

awarded to the defendant.t
ns
DATED thj

^^^day

of V\9rppher,

198/.

IPS FJtBGE'MCK

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that four copies of the within brief
have been served upon David S. Dolowitz of Parsons, Behle &
Latimer, Attorney for Respondent, 185 South State Street,
Suite 700, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84111, on this
March, 1985.

37

day of

